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I.

Appeal from the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable Judge Robin W. Reese
Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996).

II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S) PRESENTED FOR REVIEW &
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue(s) for Review. Is the trial court's determination regarding whether or not the

defendant was seized correct as a matter of law?
Standard of Review. Factual findings underlying trial courts' decisions regarding
motions to suppress are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous standard". State v. Trover,
910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995). A reviewing court "will find clear error only if [it decides]
that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the
record." IcL

Facts are considered "in a light most favorable to the trial court's

determination." Id. An appellate court then "reviews the trial court's conclusions of law

1

based on such facts under a correctness standard, [citation omitted], according no
deference to its legal conclusions." Id See also Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274, 276
(Utah App.2000).
III.

RELEVANT STATUTES
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution (included as Defendant's

Addendum B)
Salt Lake City Code Section 11.04.100 (included as the Addendum to this brief)
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Based on conduct alleged to have occurred on June 25, 2000, the defendant

Jonathan Lamar Archibald was charged with unlawfully concealing identity or furnishing
false information, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code Section
11.04.100. (R.l.)
Counsel for the defendant set the matter for motion hearing and filed an initial
memorandum in support of that motion. (R.l6-25.) The initial assigned prosecutor, on
behalf of Salt Lake City Corporation, elected not to file a responsive memorandum prior
to the motion hearing, choosing instead to present its arguments verbally at the hearing,
and supplementing them after the hearing as permitted by the trial court. (R.84, 94.)
On the date set for the motion hearing, the city prosecutor present on behalf of the
City and counsel for the defendant elected to stipulate to facts as contained in the police
report. (R.82.) The trial court heard from both sides, and indicated it would be willing to
consider additional materials from both sides. (R.94.)
2

The trial court took the matter under advisement. (R.94.) The city prosecutor
acting on behalf of the City submitted additional case law, with a responsive
memorandum. (R.26-30.) Counsel for the defendant submitted a reply memorandum and
additional case law to the trial court. (R.40-46.)
At a subsequent hearing date, the trial court rendered its decision, finding that
there was no seizure. The trial court did not proceed to the issue of whether there was
reasonable articulable suspicion, based on its finding regarding the gateway issue of
seizure. The defendant did not object to the trial court terminating its inquiry at the
seizure issue and not continuing on to the reasonable articulable suspicion issue. The
defendant elected to enter a Sery plea. (R.75-80.) This appeal followed.
V.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The underlying facts that can be gleaned from the police report, the defendant's

memorandum, and proffer at the motion hearing are as follows:
A.

Officer Brent Hillam "responded to suspicious circumstances at 176 W 600

S #201 (Motel 6) at 2247 hours." (R.23.) "2247 hours" (military time) is 10:47 P.M.
Officer Hillam indicated that the reason for the knock-and-talk was the allegation of an
anonymous complainant who had "stated that there were possible criminal activities
inside the given room." (R.23.) The anonymous complainant had reported drugs and
solicitation in room 201, listing an unknown number of suspects but referring to one
female. (R.25.)
B.

When Officer Hillam and another officer arrived at room 201, they knocked
3

at the front door. The officers were "greeted by a face looking through the curtained
window." (R.23.) It was apparent to the officers that the person at the window had
"observed two police officers and quickly removed his face from the window." (R.23.)
When officers observed the face at the window, they "continued to knock".
Approximately forty-five seconds later after the initial knock the defendant chose to open
the door. The police officers contacted the only person in the room, the defendant.
(R.23.)

At the motion hearing the city prosecutor offered the police officer's

representation that "the 45 seconds of knocking occurred after [the police] could see that
somebody was inside the room." The parties stipulated to this representation. (R.83.)
C.

The defendant gave an initial name and date of birth (DOB) of Martin

Archibald - 05-04-73. He then stated he was twenty-two years old. (R.23.) On June 25,
2000, a person with a date of birth of 05-04-73 would have been 27 years old.
D.

Officer Brent Hillam again asked the Defendant his name and date of birth,

and the defendant gave the same name and a date of birth of 05-04-75. The defendant
again stated he was twenty-two years old. The defendant continued to insist to the officer
that he was 22 years old and born in 1975. (R.23.) On June 25, 2000, a person with a date
of birth of 05-05-75 would have been twenty-five years old.
E.

The defendant subsequently revealed that his true and correct name was

John Archibald, DOB 12-18-75, and that he gave the wrong name because he thought he
had an outstanding warrant. (R.23.) On June 25, 2000, a person with a date of birth of
12-18-75 would have been twenty-four years old.
4

F.

The defendant, Jonathan Lamar Archibald, was charged with one count of

Concealing Identity or Furnishing False Information, a class "C" misdemeanor, under
Salt Lake City Code Section 11.04.100 (1996) (R.l.) (attached as an addendum to this
brief).
VI.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's determination that there was no seizure or illegal detention is

correct pursuant to established case law regarding the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution.
VII.

ARGUMENT.
A,

The trial court ruled correctly that the Defendant was not seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The defendant begins his analysis with the assertion that "[t]he hallmark of a level
I voluntary police-citizen encounter is the right of a citizen to decline answering an
officer's inquiries simply by walking away." DF's Brief at 6 (citing Salt Lake City v.
Ray, 998 P.2d 274, 277 (Utah App. 2000)). The ability of a citizen to "walk away" is not
the only defining hallmark of a level I encounter. One aspect is the ability of the citizen
to leave the presence of the officer at any time: "A level one encounter 'is a voluntary
encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any
time." Ray, 998 P.2d at 277 (citing State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App.
1990)). The defendant here had the opportunity to leave the officers' presence at any
time. Moreover, the defendant had the opportunity to simply avoid the encounter with the
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officers.
However, simply walking away is not the only option:
"[OJnce the officer has returned the driver's license and registration in a
routine traffic stop, questioning . . . may be an 'ordinary consensual
encounter between a private citizen and a law enforcement official'" so
long as a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe he was
free to leave or disregard the officer's request for information.
United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1993)(cited in Ray, 998 P.2d at
281 FN4) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Even a citizen who has freely chosen to
open his door (to police officers he knows are there) may then chose the option of
declining the officer's request for information and close the door - the functional
equivalent of the citizen who walks away down the street. If a police officer immediately
asked for the defendant's photo identification when the defendant answered the door, and
retained that identification while asking questions, there would be a seizure or detention
which parallels the "traffic stop - identification" scenario set forth in McKneely.
Thus, a citizen in a level one encounter, can remain standing in position, and
disregard the officer's request for information. Certainly, from a practical standpoint, it
would be most prudent if citizens indicate to the officer that they are declining to answer
the question absent reasonable articulable suspicion, or that they simply do not wish to
answer the question. Standing in mute silence when an officer asks a question would
present a scenario not presented in the instant case. What a citizen is not free to do is to
respond untruthfully to the officer's question. The citizen can choose: to answer or not
to answer. Deceit is not an option. There was a seizure in this case, but not until the
6

defendant lied to the officers.
Further, the defendant asserts that "[a] reasonable person would not feel free to
leave when an officer, by show of physical force or authority, restrains that person's
liberty." DF's Brief at 6 (citing Ray, 998 P.2d at 277). Ray is not so easily summarized
however:
First it is well settled that [the police officer's] request for
identification alone did not constitute a level two stop. . . . As this court has
reiterated, a request for identification alone, " 'as a matter of law, . . .
cannot constitute a show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent
encounter into a seizure.' " Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768 (quoting United States
v. Castellanos, 731 F.2d 979, 983 (D.C.Cir.1984)); accord Bean, 869 P.2d
at 987; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326,
75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("Asking for and examining
[defendant's] ticket and his driver's license were no doubt permissible in
themselves. . . . " ) .
Ray, 998 P.2d at 277. In the current case, the defendant's liberty to terminate the
encounter and close his door was not restrained. There was no verbal command to keep
the door open, there was no officer's foot in the door, there was no retention of important
personal documents.
Ray acknowledges that a level one encounter can progress to a level two encounter
under certain circumstances. In Ray, the crucial circumstance that shifted the encounter
from level one to level two was the officer's retention of the subject's identification for
the purpose of a warrant check:
Given the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that a reasonable person in
Ray's position would not feel free to just walk away, thereby abandoning
her identification, let alone to approach Officer Eldard, take back her
identification, and then leave. Instead, Officer Eldard's retention of her
7

identification during the warrant check sufficiently restrained Ray's
freedom that she was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Ray, 998 P.2d at 278 (footnote references omitted). Thus something other than a mere
request for identification must change the character of the encounter. Nothing about the
character of the encounter changed it from a level one to a level two encounter. A citizen
can willfully terminate a level one encounter. What then is the functional difference
between an encounter on the sidewalk and an encounter at the citizen's door? If anything,
a citizen would feel a heightened sense of empowerment to decline where the citizen is in
the doorframe of his abode, as opposed to merely walking down a public street.
The mere presence of a police officer in uniform is not sufficient to constitute a
show of physical force or authority such that a person becomes seized if the officer
initiates a conversation. To adopt the view proposed by the defendant would render the
concept of a consensual encounter meaningless.

Conceptually, for the idea of a

"consensual encounter" to exist, it is required that the free will of the citizen be
acknowledged. A citizen can decide to decline to respond. When then, is a citizen seized
or detained? When the officer has taken some affirmative action that indicates the citizen
is not free to leave or is not free to decline to respond to the officer's questions.
Generally, when a person's identification or other important papers
are taken by a law enforcement officer, a reasonable person would not feel
free to leave. LaFave explains that "an encounter becomes a seizure if the
officer engages in conduct which a reasonable [person] would view as
threatening or offensive even if performed by another private citizen. This
would include such tactics as . . . holding a person's identification papers
or other property.. . ."
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Ray, 998 P.2d at 278 (reference omitted). Nothing in the instant case suggests such a
"show of official authority" that a reasonable person would not have felt empowered to
utilize any one of a number of the available options: (A) ignoring the initial knock, (B)
not even bothering looking out the window, (C) ignoring 45 seconds of knocking, or (D)
once the door was answered telling the officers that he was not going to answer any
questions and closing the door. Knocking on the door for 45 seconds is not so threatening
or offensive as to constitute a seizure. This is factually distinct from a scenario where the
officers stand at the door and knock for 45 minutes. This is factually distinct from a
scenario where the officers stand outside the door for hours, knocking for 45 seconds at
fifteen minute intervals. This is factually distinct from a scenario where on the citizen's
refusal to answer any questions and attempt to close the door that the officers use force to
keep the door open and demand answers. The current case presents none of those
scenarios.
If a citizen indicated that he did not want to answer any more questions, that he
was tired, needed to sleep for the next day's work, and began to close the door, and the
officer prevented the citizen from closing that door, the citizen could effectively claim to
be "seized". However, simply having two officers at your door does not amount to a
seizure. The citizen may decline and withdraw to the safe harbor of his residence. At
that juncture, the Fourth Amendment protections related to one's residence would take
over. The officers on the current facts would not have been entitled to force entry. A
search warrant would have been required. Under the current facts, any citizen would
9

have been entitled to decline to answer the question as to identity and to leave - to leave
the front door and return to his abode, leaving the officers standing at the door. If we do
not accept the citizen's free will under these facts, acknowledging that "the reasonable
citizen" would have felt entitled to not answer the door or to decline to answer any
questioning, then the concept of a level one consensual encounter is rendered virtually
meaningless.
1. The Time of the Encounter.
The defendant points to Utah Code Annotated Sections 77-7-5 and 77-23-205 as
support for the position that the time of the encounter contributes significantly to the
analysis regarding seizure. The defendant presented none of the statutes referred to here
to the trial court below.

Having failed to present those arguments for the courts

consideration below, this court should disregard them.

Should this court agree to

consider these references and argument, the City responds as follows.
The defendant is arguing for a legal determination that police may only visit
someone's abode during regular business hours unless they possess reasonable articulable
suspicion. A knock at 10:47 P.M. (R.16) is not so far beyond the pale that any reasonable
person would only expect such a knock if it was an emergency. Even if this defendant
considered it "unreasonable", that objection is a different type of unreasonable from the
"reasonable" in reasonable articulable suspicion. The record does not tell us in fact that
the defendant considered this time unreasonable. Time of day by itself does not mean
that police knocking on the door when the occupants may be asleep immediately rises to
10

the level of a seizure. It is possible that the occupant of any given residence may be
asleep at any given time, if that person works the night shift for example, and might
consider a knock at the door mid-day unreasonable.
As to the issue of time and arrest warrants under UCA 77-7-5, defining
"nighttime" as 10PM-6AM, the police officers here were not executing misdemeanor or
felony arrest warrants. They were responding to a report of "suspicious circumstances"
(R.23) without the expectation of serving any arrest warrant. The officers apparently did
not know who they would find at the motel room. The limitations of law regarding
service of arrest warrants do not provide a legal limit for police work in the community
where the extent of the action taken is to stand at the door and knock as any citizen is
entitled to do.
As to the issue of time and search warrants under UCA 77-23-205, again, the
officers apparently arrived at the motel room without any expectation of serving a search
warrant. State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614 (Utah App. 1993), defines nighttime as running
from 30 minutes after sunset through 30 minutes before sunrise for the purpose of service
of search warrants. It does not address the issue of how time of day contributes to a
determination regarding seizure or detention. Neither this code section nor Simmons
proscribe police conduct that the defendant may consider "unreasonable". The limitations
of law regarding service of search warrants do not provide a legal standard for police
work in the community where the extent of the action taken is to stand at the door and
knock as any citizen is entitled to do.
11

For a level one encounter, without considering reasonable articulable suspicion or
probable cause, the mere lateness of the hour does not make the officers' attempts to
initiate contact an unlawful exercise of police authority. There is nothing in the record to
suggest that a u Do Not Disturb" placard was hung from the doorknob of this motel room.
The "higher standard of courtesy and respect" argued for by the defendant might be a
matter of police department policy, but it is not a matter for judicial determination.
Simply put, police work is not a Monday through Friday, 9AM though 5PM proposition.
2. The Location of the Encounter.
California v. Hodari P., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed. 2d 690 (1991),
was brought to the attention of the trial court. (R.27, 91.) The relevance of Hodari to the
current matter is in its discussion of what constitutes seizure, which is, as the trial court
indicated, the crucial inquiry. If a show of authority in the form of pursuit does not rise to
the level of an actual or constructive seizure, how can consensual conversation at the door
of the citizen? If a citizen's liberty interest is not constrained by being pursued through
the streets, how can a citizen's liberty interest be constrained by willfully opening the
door to the police and willfully engaging in conversation with them? Further, the fact that
reasonable articulable suspicion was not present at the outset of the Hodari pursuit did not
stop the Hodari court from ruling there was no seizure. Hodari, 111 S.Ct. at 1552-53.
The restraint of liberty by force (i.e., the Hodari tackle) must be distinguished from
other shows of authority (i.e., police requesting and retaining a citizen's photo
identification) that create a constructive seizure of the person. There is then a hierarchy
12

of police-citizen contact to be evaluated: actual restraint by physical force, constructive
restraint by show of authority, and mere interaction involving neither of the above. The
case presently before this court involves mere interaction between police and a citizen.
The defendant asserts that the defendant "did submit to the officers' show of
authority because he had no other option." DF Brief at 11. This is incorrect. The
defendant's first option was to decide whether or not to even look out the window. In
one's abode at 10:47 PM one need not even look out the window upon hearing a knock at
the door. Having looked out the window, the defendant was free to just ignore whatever
knocking was occurring at the door, absent the announcement of warrant service. If the
defendant was not going to just ignore the knocking, he was free to talk to the officers
through the door without opening it. "Before I open the door, could you tell me what this
is about?" Once the defendant had made the decision to open the door he still had
options. The defendant was free to respond to the officers "before I answer any questions
can you tell me what this is about?" In the alternative, the defendant could have declined
to speak with the officers at all, saying no more than "I really don't want to talk to you if I
don't have to" and closing the door. His final option was to decide to leave his motel
room and go for a drive or a walk. There is no suggestion in the record that was not an
option available to him. There is no suggestion in the record that the defendant availed
himself of any of the range of options. The defendant had a range of options. He simply
chose not to exercise them.
The defendant mischaracterizes the situation: "this was an encounter at Mr.
13

Archibald's residence, with the officers blocking Mr. Archibald's only means of entry
into and exit from the residence." DF's Brief at 11. The defendant suggests that the
location of a police-citizen encounter (residential doorway v. public thoroughfare) is
important in this case. The fact that this encounter took place at the defendant's residence
actually works against the defendant's position. If a citizen is going to feel he has any
alternative options, it is at his residence - as opposed to being stopped on a public street.
If citizens' homes are their castles, then citizens are going to feel more empowered at
home than if engaged on a sidewalk or street.
The officers were standing at the defendant's doorway. There is no reference in
the record to the defendant attempting to exit his motel room. The officers took no
affirmative action indicating to the defendant he could not just walk out and past them.
There was nothing telling the defendant he had to open the door - no command "This is
the police - open the door or we'll break it down!!!" There was no order to keep the door
open - and no command to stay where he was.
How would the presence of an alternative entrance or exit have made a difference?
It would not have. There were two officers present. Presumably, one officer could have
remained at the front door and another at any other access point. Would the presence of a
second access point have made a difference to a citizen at 10:47PM at night? No, it
would not have. Perhaps at 7:00AM, a citizen could exit out the back door in an effort to
avoid the officers.

At 10:47PM, presumably the citizen's interest is in remaining at

home.
14

The defendant asserts a distinction exists where the encounter occurs in a
"confined" area versus on a public street. DF's Brief at 11. There are distinctions even
between "confined" areas. There are confined areas without avenues of retreat, and there
are confined areas with avenues of retreat.

There is a distinction between officers

encountering a citizen in a dead end alley and encountering the citizen in the doorway of
the citizen's residence. The citizen encountered in a deadend alley must either remain in
the presence of the officers or move past the officers to continue his/her business. The
defendant here had an avenue of retreat and made a free will decision not to use that
avenue of retreat - returning to the interior of the motel room and closing the door. The
citizen could presumably close the door and, if the officers persisted in knocking on the
door at that point in an effort to force the citizen to return to the door, the citizen could
ignore the knocking, ask the officers to stop, or call the police officers' shift supervisor to
ask that the officers stop.
The defendant makes a decided point in attempting to suggest that the 7th Circuit
misstated the law in United States v. $32,400.00, 82 F.3d 135 (7th Cir. 1996). DF's Brief
at 12, FN5. The $32,400.00 court does seem to suggest in one paragraph that physical
force must be applied in order for a seizure to occur. $32,400.00, 82 F.3d at 138.
However, in the next paragraph the $32,400.00 court acknowledges that physical force or
submission to asserted authority may bring about a seizure:
This court [the 7th Circuit] has applied this test from Hodari D. In
Kernats v. O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 1994), we recognized that
"[u]nder this test, a fleeing suspect—even one who is confronted with an
15

obvious show of authority—is not seized until his freedom of movement is
terminated by intentional application of physical force or by the suspect's
submission to the asserted authority." Id. at 1178 n. 4 (citing Hodari, 499
U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547). We have also recognized that neither a police
officer who chases a suspect unsuccessfully nor an officer who yells "stop"
at a fleeing person has effected a seizure. Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 957
(7th Cir. 1992) (applying HodariD.)
$32,400.00, 82 F.3d at 139. The accurate comparison between $32,400.00 is made in this
manner. The defendant in $32,400.00 was not actually "seized" until "[a]fter a tenminute chase [the defendant] was stopped when four police cars surrounded her and
slowed down their vehicles to force her car to stop." $32,400.00, 82 F.3d at 137. There is
no comparison between the "show of authority" inherent in a ten-minute police chase
terminated by being boxed-in by four cars and being forced to a stop and 45 seconds of
knocking on a motel room at 10:47 P.M. The officers' initial contact with the $32,400.00
defendant was based on reasonable suspicion, so its relevance to the matter at hand is
limited to the comparison of degrees in demonstrations of authority.
After discussing Hodari P., the defendant turns for support to State v. Smith, 781
P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989). DF's Brief at 12. The defendant's reliance on State v. Smith
is misplaced. There is little or no relevant comparison between Smith and the instant
case. The defendant's attempted argument is that if police officers place themselves in
any possible path of motion the subject of the blocking has been seized. Smith presented
a fact pattern of an officer observing a traffic violation (a turn without signaling that itself
created reasonable articulable suspicion), that officer pulling in behind the subject in a
manner which blocked motion, apparently using either overhead lights or a spotlight to
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"effectuate the stop", in a manner which led the officer himself to conclude that he had
"stopped" the defendant, and the issuance of a citation. Smith at 880.
The defendant asserts that "the officers were obstructing the only entrance into and
exit from [the defendant's] room". DF's Brief at 13. The key word here is "obstructing".
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant actually tried to leave the
room past the officers. The mere presence of police officers would not suggest to the
reasonable citizen that the citizen was not free to walk past the officers and proceed down
the hall. The officers were not obstructing anything. The officers were merely standing
at the doorway. Nothing in the record suggests otherwise.
The defendant continues: "[the defendant] had no place to go if he wished to avoid
the officers". DF Brief at 13. Again, the defendant had the option of not answering the
door in the first place. The defendant had the option of talking to the officers through a
closed door. And the defendant had the option of opening the door, learning what the
officers were there for, and then declining to answer and closing the door upon learning.
Thus the defendant had a place to go - the safe harbor of his abode - and options to
avoid, minimize, or terminate contact with the officers.

There is nothing in analysis

under Smith that addresses this scenario.
Finally, the defendant asserts that "clearly the officers were not content with [the
defendant's] apparent unwillingness to speak with them. . . . The officers kept knocking,
however, clearly conveying a message to [the defendant] that [the officers] were not
going to leave until he answered the door." DF's Brief at 13 (emphasis added). The
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defendant overstates the message that can be drawn from continued knocking. Again, the
defendant had options in the face of continued knocking. One, disregard or ignore it.
Two, approach the door and ask through a closed door what the officers needed. Three,
answer the door, answer inquiries honestly if he desired, or decline to answer if he saw
fit, and to close the door. The officers knocked initially. The defendant looked out the
window, disclosing his presence. The officers knocked again. It is entirely reasonable to
assume that had the defendant not disclosed his presence - and the fact that he was awake
- the officers would have gone on their way. There is nothing in the record regarding
whether the knocking could be characterized as polite or impolite. DF's Brief at 13.
In the Smith line of cases is State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765 (Utah App.1990). The
central question in Jackson is pertinent to the current case: "The central inquiry of this
case is whether defendant was seized before an articulable suspicion of criminal activity
existed." Jackson, 805 P.2d at 766.
Defendant claims that, when [the police officer] parked directly
behind his car, a seizure occurred because defendant believed he was not
free to leave. Defendant cites State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah Ct.App.
1989)
The above cases, holding that a police officer's blocking of another's
vehicle constituted a seizure, are distinguishable from the case at hand. In
the instant case, although the trial court found that [the police officer] had
ultimately blocked defendant's car, the blocking did not occur until after
defendant had exited his car of his own volition. Moreover, it was
defendant's voluntary act that initiated the contact with [the police officer],
rather than [the police officer's conduct]. Defendant arrived at the parking
lot to the Foxy Lady Bar not because [the police officer] was following him,
but rather because he freely chose to go there.
Defendant exited his vehicle and approached [the police officer's]
vehicle while it was still moving. Defendant was free to walk to the bar or
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wherever he chose; he voluntarily chose to confront [the police officer]....
Jackson, 805 P.2d at 767-68. The striking element of these paragraphs is the heavy
emphasis the Jackson court placed on the defendant's voluntary conduct. It is the same
voluntary conduct in the case at hand that should be given a similar weight. Here, the
defendant chose to engage the officers by opening the door. That same element of
voluntary conduct on the part of the citizen involved in the encounter was found in
another case relied on the Jackson court:
This factual situation is similar to that in Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d
965, 967 (Utah Ct. App.1987), where a police officer followed defendant as
he parked his truck at a construction site. Defendant exited his truck
without any request by the officer, walked over to the police car as the
officer was getting out, and freely initiated the conversation. We held it
was a consensual, voluntary discussion and thus not a seizure subject to
fourth amendment protection. Here we also draw the same conclusion.
Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768. The Jackson court also looked to the trial court record for
indicators regarding the nature of any associated "show of authority":
Defendant argues that it was [the police officer's] aggressive manner
and show of authority that caused him to stop. Nothing in the record
substantiates this argument. [The police officer] had not actuated his light
bars, used his siren, nor had he driven in such a manner that would cause
defendant to think he was required to pull over.
Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768. There is a similar absence of any aggressive show of authority
present in the record in the case currently before the court. Knocking at a door open to
the public, and continuing to knock once aware that the room is occupied, is not an
aggressive show of authority compelling the defendant to answer the door. Once at the
door, there was no action to compel the defendant to answer the officers' questions, and
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certainly nothing to compel a false answer. The issue of a request for identification was
the next point in the Jackson court analysis: "Applying the Deitman standard to the facts
of this case, [the police officer's] request for identification did not constitute a seizure
because defendant voluntarily initiated the contact and was free to go at any time and not
answer [the police officer's] questions." Jackson, 805 P.2d at 769 (referring to State v.
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987)). There is nothing the record in the current case to
suggest that the defendant was not in a similar situation - free to go (closing the door) and
not answering the officers' questions.
3. The Length of Knocking.
The defendant reports that
While 45 seconds may not seem like a significant period of time on paper, it
is an unbearably long period of time when actually demonstrated. Defense
counsel attempted to demonstrate how long 45 seconds really is by
knocking for 45 seconds straight on the wooden podium in the courtroom,
much in the same way a person would knock on a door. (R.89.) The court
stopped defense counsel after 15-20 seconds of knocking. (R.89.)
DF's Brief at 14. Actually all the trial court was doing was telling defense counsel that
she did not need to knock the entire forty-five seconds, and that she could merely indicate
for the court when the time period had passed: "JUDGE: I don't think you need to keep
knocking, just say stop when we are there." Defense counsel elected not to do so, and
proceeded with her argument. (R.89.)

Forty-five seconds of knocking is not the

equivalent of 45 seconds of unbearable coercion forcing the defendant to open the door.
What the record does not disclose is how much time passed between the time the
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defendant stuck his head in the window and the time the officers resumed their forty-five
seconds of knocking. Once the officers had knocked at the door and saw the defendant
put his face in the window, it someone does not immediately open the door (to anyone,
not just police officers) it is fair to expect that the person at the door will knock again.
Knocking for 2-3 minutes while shouting "we know you are in there, come out with your
hands up" would present a different situation. It is not the situation this case presents.
Forty-five seconds of knocking does not mean that the officers would not leave
until they received a response, and it is too much to claim that at that point the defendant
was seized. Forty-five seconds of knocking can also be interpreted to mean "we saw you,
we know you are there, and we would still like to talk to you". It says nothing about how
long the police are willing to stay there without a response. It does not say "we have a
search warrant". It does not say "open the door or we'll break it down". At that point the
defendant had the option of ignoring them for a while to see if they would in fact just go
way. The defendant also had the option of speaking to the officers through the door to
see what they wanted. The defendant would have been entitled to ask through the door
"How can I help you officers?"
Forty-five seconds of knocking under these circumstances does not support the
conclusion that the defendant was seized in violation of our Fourth Amendment.
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B.
THE OFFICERS DID NOT REQUIRE REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION TO INITIATE A LEVEL ONE ENCOUNTER WITH THE
DEFENDANT - THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT SEIZED UNTIL HE PROVIDED
FALSE INFORMATION.
The only seizure that occurred here was once the defendant had lied to the police
officers, committing an offense in their presence. The issue of reasonable articulable
suspicion before that point was not addressed by the trial court below. The appropriate
action for this appellate court is to remand this matter for the trial court's ruling on that
point, if and only if this court finds that the defendant was seized before the defendant
provided false information to the officers.
Further, the defendant's own statement of the issues indicates that the sole issue
before this court is "[wjhether the district court erred in denying Mr. Archibald's motion
to suppress based on the court's conclusion that Mr. Archibald was not seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment when police officers questioned him?" DF's Brief at 1. No
reference is made there or by way of standard of review to suggest that the issue of
reasonable articulable suspicion is properly before this court. It should be noted that 14
of the 30 cases the defendant lists in his table of authorities are cited in his section
devoted to the issue of reasonable articulable suspicion, an issue not even before this
court.
The issues related to an analysis of reasonable articulable suspicion are distinct
from the issues related to seizure as presented here, and not an additional subset or
component of level I encounter analysis. The defendant has made no showing that where
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a trial court makes a decision on a threshold or gateway issue and does not reach a
secondary issue or argument that an appellate court should address the issue.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The defendant was not seized when he chose to answer the door of his motel room
to two police officers and chose to respond to their questions. His exercise of free will
was reasonable in light of the time of day, the location of the encounter, and the length of
time the officers knocked at the door. There was no seizure prior to the defendant
committing an offense in the presence of the officers.
In the event this court rules otherwise, the appropriate action by this court is to
remand this matter to the trial court for further action based on this court's ruling
regarding the gateway issue of seizure or unlawful detention, with directions to then
address the issue of reasonable articulable suspicion.
The City respectfully requests that this court follow the line of analysis set forth in
State v. Jackson and Layton City v. Bennett and affirm the ruling of the trial court,
denying the defendant's motion to suppress.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

1r

day of April, 2001.

Senior Assistant City Prosecutor
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
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SALT LAKE CITY CODE SECTION 11.04.100
Concealing identity or furnishing false information.
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally conceal or attempt to conceal
his or her identity, falsely identify himself or herself, or furnish or give false or
misleading information to any person charged with enforcement of city ordinances,
including but not limited to the following:
A.

Any police officer of the city corporation;

B.

An employee of the city fire department;

C.
An employee of the city-county health department enforcing the city health
ordinances;
D.

Parking enforcement officers;

E.

City licensing personnel;

F.

Zoning enforcement officers;

G.

Planning officials; and/or

H.

Building officials. (Prior code § 32-10-1)
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